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THE PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNICATIVE LANGUAGE USE*
enikő németh t.
The paper aims to overview some typical principles of communicative language use in a
cognitive pragmatic approach applying a reductionist method in order to demonstrate
that the well-known principles can be reduced to a very general rationality (econ-
omy) principle. After briefly reviewing the principles the paper re-evaluates them and
provides a new classification of them relying on the definition of ostensive-inferential
communication. The principles which can be divided into rationality and interperson-
ality principles are really principles of effective information transmission on objects and
selves. They refer to two kinds of language use: informative and communicative ones.
The only principles valid for only communicative language use are the communicative
principle of relevance and the principle of communicative intention suggested in the
present article. Finally, the paper reduces all rationality and interpersonality principles
to a very general rationality principle, i.e., the cognitive principle of relevance.
1. Introduction
1.1. Aims
The present paper aims to explore some of the typical principles of com-
municative language use. As a starting-point for the investigation, I will
define communicative language use within the scope of pragmatic com-
petence. Then I will give a brief overview of the possibilities raised in
the linguistics literature of how to interpret the term principle, as well as
select the relevant interpretations fitting in with the aims of this paper.
After completing these tasks, I will have three main goals: (i) to choose,
briefly characterize and evaluate some typical communicative principles
treated by the pragmatics literature; (ii) to re-evaluate the chosen prin-
ciples and provide a new classification of them relying on the definition
of ostensive-inferential communication, and (iii) to demonstrate that all
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principles can be reduced to a very general rationality (economy) princi-
ple, i.e., to the cognitive principle of relevance. It should be emphasized
that I will not aim to deal with all principles assumed for verbal com-
munication in the literature. I will choose only some typical well-known
principles which I consider a necessary and sufficient basis for achieving
the third goal of the present paper. On the basis of the definition of
ostensive-inferential communication I also want to emphasize that the
principles considered communicative ones in the pragmatics literature
are really principles of effective information transmission either on ob-
jects or on selves, i.e., they play a considerable role in verbal informa-
tion transmission without communicative intention. The only principles
which refer solely to communicative language use are Sperber and Wil-
son’s (1986/1995) communicative principle of relevance and the principle
of communicative intention suggested in the present article. At this point,
it should be noted that I take the notion of principle very strictly in the
present paper. I consider only those constraints, prescriptions or general-
izations which are called principles in the literature. However, if one looks
at the content of the principles, and not just their labels, one can find
other “principles” working in communicative language use. For example,
Bach and Harnish (1979, 7) propose a communicative presumption not
labelled “principle” which is similar to the principle of communicative
intention in some respect.1
According to the way of thinking sketched out above, the paper
is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly characterizes the notions of
pragmatic competence and communicative language use, while section 3
enumerates the possible interpretations of the term principle. Section 4
overviews some typical principles of communicative language use. In sec-
tion 5 I evaluate the principles treated in section 4 independently of any
particular pragmatics theory, then, relying on the definition of ostensive-
inferential communication in relevance theory, I re-evaluate them, and
further I suggest an old-new principle,2 namely the principle of commu-
nicative intention. In the remainder of this section, I demonstrate that
all principles can be reduced to a general rationality principle, i.e., to the
cognitive principle of relevance. Section 6 summarizes the results.
1 For more details see section 5.3.
2 The adjective old-new means that the principle of communicative intention is
an old one as to the main part of its content (see e.g., Grice 1975/1989; Bach–
Harnish 1979; Sperber–Wilson 1986/1995), and at the same time, it is a new one
as to its formulation as a principle.
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1.2. A cognitive pragmatic approach and reductionist method
In the paper, I will study some typical principles of communicative lan-
guage use in a cognitive pragmatic approach applying a reductionist
method. One of the cognitive pragmatic approaches closely related to
the generative linguistics paradigm, modular pragmatics (cf. Kasher 1986;
1991), intends to describe pragmatic competence as the faculty of lan-
guage use, which contains the knowledge of ideal native speakers of a
language about how to use their language in various situations to reach
various goals. Pragmatic competence is one of the modules of the hu-
man mind which enables a native speaker to use sentences in accordance
with his/her intentions to achieve goals (e.g., to complete various speech
acts) in different contexts. The main question for generative modular
pragmatics is how native speakers can apply their pragmatic abilities
adequately in the course of constructing utterances.
Another cognitive pragmatic theory, namely relevance theory (cf.
e.g., Sperber–Wilson 1986/1995; Kempson 1996; Sperber 2000; Carston
2000), also studies communication from the point of view of the activities
of the human mind.3 But in contrast to generative modular pragmatics,
relevance theory mostly deals with the comprehension processes and dis-
cusses what principles, constraints and restrictions are taken into account
by the communicative partners to retrieve the information effectively and
successfully from the sequences of words uttered or written. Therefore,
the main question for relevance theory is how communicative partners
interpret the communicators’ ostensive communicative behaviour.4
However, if one focuses on the dynamism of communication, it is
not sufficient to concentrate either on the communicator’s actions, as
modular pragmatics does, or on the partner’s comprehension processes
as relevance theory does. One should consider both the communicator’s
and the interlocutor’s sides to describe and explain their communication.5
3 Relevance theory also supposes that the human mind has a modular organization,
but the modularity hypothesis of relevance theorists has changed from the first
summary of the theory published in 1986. See also fn. 8.
4 Ostensive behaviour is a kind of behaviour which makes manifest an intention to
make something manifest (Sperber–Wilson 1986/1995, 49). The ostension will
be discussed in more detail in section 4.
5 The definition of ostensive-inferential communication in relevance theory includes
dynamism of communication (see (9) in section 4). This definition has served as
one of the starting points for the elaboration of relevance theory. Therefore, it
is very surprising that relevance theory restricts pragmatics to the investigation
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To fulfil this requirement, I suggest an approach which unifies the main
aims of the above-mentioned two cognitive pragmatics theories, i.e., I
will discuss how native speakers of a language are able to use their lan-
guage adequately to achieve various goals in different contexts, as well as
what principles, restrictions or constraints play a role in comprehension
processes.
In addition to the cognitive pragmatic approach, I will apply a re-
ductionist method in the course of the investigation of the principles of
communicative language use. The application of the reductionist method
places my work in a line of pragmatic research that aims to reduce the
categories and principles describing and explaining the rational behaviour
of language users to more general categories and principles. Of course, a
reduction can be successful only if the resulting categories or principles
are able to describe and explain everything as well as, and even better
than, the original categories and principles did (cf. e.g., Kasher 1976;
Horn 1984/1998; Levinson 2000). In section 5, I will characterize prin-
ciples belonging to various theories in a unified way on the basis of the
definition of ostensive-inferential communication. This unified character-
ization makes it possible to have generalizations by means of which all
principles can be reduced to a very general cognitive rationality principle.
2. Pragmatic competence and communicative language use
Chomsky (1977, 3) develops his competence–performance distinction, es-
tablished in the early stage of generative linguistics (Chomsky 1965, 4),
and states that, in the course of language acquisition, children acquire not
only their native language but also the ways of using it. So children reach
a cognitive state by the end of the language acquisition and language use
acquisition processes that consists of two main components. One is the
knowledge of language, i.e., grammatical competence, the other one is
the knowledge of language use, i.e., pragmatic competence. Pragmatic
competence enables people to use their knowledge of language to reach
various general goals, e.g., to communicate, to think and to memorize
in various situations. Pragmatic competence as a module of the human
mind must be modelled by a pragmatic theory abstracting away from the
of comprehension processes and does not deal with the communicators’ osten-
sive behaviour to a sufficient extent, in reality not taking into consideration the
dynamism of communication.
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particular realizations of language use in particular situations. Pragmatic
competence cooperates with other cognitive structures and mechanisms
(e.g., memory, perception, the social-interactive system) in the course of
real language use. To describe this cooperation is a task of a perfor-
mance theory (cf. Németh T. 1996, 6–7).
This Chomskyan (1977) perspective provides the approach of mod-
ular pragmatics to pragmatic competence as its basis. As we have seen
in 1.2, in modular pragmatics Kasher (1986, 139–41; 1991, 386–92) char-
acterizes the notion of pragmatic competence from the point of view of
an ideal native speaker. Pragmatic abilities of native speakers include,
among other things, the system of constitutive rules of speech acts; rules
and principles governing basic aspects of conversation; principles and
strategies governing rational intentional actions such as generating con-
versational implicatures; politeness considerations; as well as interface
pragmatic knowledge to integrate data from a linguistic channel with
data from other channels.6 In Kasher’s (1991, 382) opinion—similarly
to Chomsky’s approach—, the scope of pragmatic competence includes
not only the knowledge governing language use in communication. Prag-
matics cannot be identified with the study of verbal communication ex-
clusively. Bierwisch (1980; 1983) also comes to the same conclusion but
from a different starting point: he sharply criticizes speech act theory
because of the identification of language use and communication and he
emphasizes that the use of language to communicate is not the unique
form of language use. There are several other kinds of language use such
as the use of language to think, to memorize or to learn; the use of lan-
guage in taking notes, in playing, in singing for fun or in psycholinguistic
experiments, etc.7
However, there is an important difference between Chomsky’s and
Kasher’s approaches concerning pragmatic abilities. Kasher (1991, 386–
96) does not situate pragmatic knowledge in one module. He considers
the abilities responsible for the linguistic government of language use
modular, while the not purely linguistic factors governing language use
are considered to be central. This interpretation of the notion of prag-
matic competence has a wider scope than in Chomsky’s definition. It also
6 In the present paper I do not deal with the inherent organization of pragmatic
competence supposed by Kasher (1986; 1991).
7 Consequently, communicative competence as defined by Hymes (1972) cannot
be identified with pragmatic competence, either: it is only a part of pragmatic
competence. Another argument for this can be found in Németh T. (1996, 8–10).
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contains a part of the knowledge and processes that Chomsky refers to
as part of performance. Further, Kasher’s pragmatic competence cannot
be characterized in terms of the classical modularity hypothesis (Fodor
1983) either, because pragmatic competence is not a unique, informa-
tionally encapsulated system, so it cannot be considered a module in the
classical Fodorian sense.
The other cognitive pragmatic theory, relevance theory, differs from
Chomsky’s approach to a greater extent than Kasher’s modular prag-
matics does. Relevance theorists (cf. e.g., Reboul–Moeschler 1998; Sper-
ber 2000; Sperber–Wilson 2002) use an extended interpretation of mod-
ularity.8 The extended modularity hypothesis supposes that in addition
to peripheral systems there is not only one central system in the human
mind. Instead, peripheral systems can be connected with more than one
conceptual module, and furthermore, the conceptual modules themselves
are not independent of each other. In this new version of the modu-
larity hypothesis, pragmatic competence is a metacognitive domain, the
core ability of which is a metarepresentational ability. Pragmatic compe-
tence can be divided into three subsystems: 1. a metapsychology module
which is responsible for thought attribution; 2. a comprehension module
containing abilities by means of which one can find out the interlocu-
tor’s communicative intentions, and 3. a logical module which checks
arguments. These three subsystems operate together when one applies
pragmatic competence in the course of language use.9 The idea to sit-
uate pragmatic abilities in several modules is similar to Kasher’s (1991)
solution, and it differs from Fodor’s (1983) classical modularity theory
in the same way, i.e., it does not consider pragmatic competence to be
a unique, informationally encapsulated system. However, I should note
that the other non-communicative forms of language use mentioned above
are not included in the definition of pragmatic competence formulated by
relevance theorists. Relevance theory refers pragmatics only to communi-
cation; furthermore, it concentrates on the partners’ comprehension tasks
in ostensive-inferential communication. In this respect, pragmatic com-
petence in relevance theory has a narrower scope than it does in Kasher’s
modular pragmatics. From another point of view, pragmatic competence
8 The earlier versions of relevance theory (cf. Sperber–Wilson 1986/1995) mostly
rely on Fodor’s (1983) classical modularity hypothesis. For a critical discussion
of classical modularity see also Fodor (2000).
9 For more detailed discussion of the extended modularity hypothesis and changes
of the modularity hypothesis in relevance theory see Pléh (2000b).
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in relevance theory has a wider scope than it does in modular pragmatics,
because pragmatic abilities are used not only in verbal communication
but in all kinds of communication. Consequently, for relevance theory,
pragmatics is not a linguistic subdiscipline.
The real existence of pragmatic competence seems to be supported by
the latest neurolinguistic research (Paradis 1998). It differentiates dam-
age in grammatical competence in the left hemisphere of the brain from
damage in pragmatic competence in the right hemisphere of the brain
very convincingly. This differentiation provides neurolinguistic evidence
for the existence of pragmatic competence already hypothesized in prag-
matic theories. In contrast with damage in the left hemisphere, lesions in
the right hemisphere do not lead to grammatical (i.e., phonological, mor-
phological, syntactic) deficits, that is, to one or another kind of aphasia,
but they result in considerable systematic disfunctions in the course of
the production and interpretation of indirect speech acts, conversational
implicatures, metaphors, humour, discourse coherence etc. Evaluations
of the neurological status of patients with damage in pragmatic compe-
tence demonstrate that pragmatic abilities are not restricted to a specific
domain, but they are located in several sites in the right hemisphere of
the brain.
Summarizing the relevant results of pragmatic theories and neurolin-
guistic research, as well as considering her own results, Ivaskó (2002) con-
cludes that pragmatic competence cannot be considered a unique module
in the mind. Rather, it can be characterized as an ability which orga-
nizes and governs the operations and cooperation of various systems,
especially in the use of signs to communicate.
Relying on the results of pragmatic theory and neurolinguistics (cf.
Kasher 1991; Paradis 1998; Sperber 2000; Ivaskó 2002), I define pragmatic
competence as the faculty of the human mind not restricted to one mod-
ule but containing and organizing procedural and declarative knowledge
concerning not only communicative but all possible forms of language
use. Abilities governing the production and interpretation mechanisms
in verbal communication, i.e., abilities responsible for successful commu-
nicative language use, are subparts of pragmatic competence.
One of the central tasks of the disciplines investigating language
use — e.g., pragmatics, discourse analysis,10 sociolinguistics, social psy-
10 The term discourse analysis covers all disciplines which deal with discourses or
texts, e.g., conversation analysis, text analysis, text linguistics, discourse gram-
mar.
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chology—is to study what principles, constraints, restrictions govern or
regulate language use (Levinson 1983). However, because of the fact that
these disciplines analyse language use only in communicative interactions,
principles supposed by them are really principles of communicative lan-
guage use.
Before starting to discuss principles of communicative language use, I
should make it clear in section 3 what interpretations of the term principle
will be used in the following parts of the paper.
3. Interpretations of the term principle in linguistics
3.1. Rules and principles
Generative linguistics theories11 model the knowledge of language, i.e.,
grammatical competence, by means of a formal rule system and also pro-
vide particular grammatical principles and constraints on the operation
of rules. All these together are subsumed under the notion of grammar.
The latest versions of Chomsky’s generative grammar (see e.g., Chomsky
1995; Radford 1997) use the term rule less than earlier versions did, and
sometimes they do not use it at all. Instead, rules are replaced by oper-
ations, constraints and principles.12 Particular grammatical sentences of
a language can be derived by means of the application of the operations
taking into account the relevant principles and constraints. However, it
is not quite clear what the essential difference is between rules and oper-
ations. Operations work very similarly to how rules were applied: that is
the reason why operations can still be considered rules.13 One of the most
important and distinctive features of grammatical rules is their predic-
tivity. Word sequences constructed by grammatical rules, i.e., sentences,
are always well-formed, they are not results of any choices, they are ideal-
ized and invariant in comparison with empirically observable utterances
(Taylor–Cameron 1987; Németh T. 1994, 69; 1996, 22–8).
11 By generative linguistics I mean not only the Chomskyan framework, but also
each theory which operates by means of explicit rule application.
12 The changes of generative grammar concerning the status of rules in the the-
ory and the motivation for the changes are summarized and evaluated in Smith
(1999). Generative grammatical and pragmatic (relevance theoretical) principles,
their similarities and differences are discussed in Carston (2000).
13 Both terms, i.e., operation and rule are used e.g., in Smith (1999); É. Kiss (1998,
17 vs. 2003, 205).
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Unlike grammatical competence, the ability to use language, i.e.,
pragmatic competence cannot be described by means of a strict formal
rule system.14 The pragmatics literature supposes that the adequate use
of language is governed by principles, strategies, restrictions and heuris-
tics instead of rules in the above sense (Leech 1983; Mey 1995; Levinson
2000). However, it is worth noting that one can also meet the term rule in
the literature on language use. A rule as a synonym for principle is not a
constitutive, creative, inviolable inner rule like a grammatical rule. Such
rules applied in the description of language use are regulative, contin-
gent, not creative, they are social constructs similarly to Wittgensteinian
rules (Pléh 2000a; Lerch 2002). However, there is another interpreta-
tion of the term rule in pragmatics, namely in speech act theory. Searle
(1969) establishes constitutive rules for speech acts relying on conditions
of success. The constitutive rules for speech acts are very similar to gram-
matical rules in their nature. If one fails to conform to a constitutive rule
(at least one which states a condition of success for an act), then one
will not have performed the act. Similarly, if one fails to conform to a
rule of the grammar of a particular language, i.e., violates it, then one
will not have generated a sentence of the given language.15 The formal
and social interpretations of the concept of rule are not inconsistent, as
is demonstrated by Kertész (2001) when he compares the theses of gen-
erative grammar and late Wittgensteinian philosophy from the points of
view of the theory of science and the sociology of knowledge. The two
interpretations of the term rule are not inconsistent not only in the study
of language and language use, but they both can also be verified in the
operation of the mind and even of the brain (Pléh 2001, 420–1).
The normative, prescriptive principles and restrictions of commu-
nicative language use that will be studied in section 4 belong to the
second interpretation of rule. Since not all principles relating to commu-
nicative language use treated in the literature are prescriptive in nature,
it seems reasonable to give an overview of the other possibilities of the
interpretation of the term principle as well.
14 In the last decades, some researchers became sceptical in connection with rule
application in modelling the knowledge of language (cf. e.g., Rumelhart et al.
1986) and proposed a special “double” model (cf. e.g., Pinker 1994). In these
models, both rule based behaviour and associative organization are accepted.
For the application of these models to Hungarian data see Lukács (2001); Pléh–
Lukács (2002).
15 It is worth mentioning at the same time that one can speak ungrammatically, i.e.,
using non-sentences and still fulfil communicative goals and also be understood.
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3.2. Interpretations of the term principle
The term principle has been widely used in the linguistics literature for
a long time.16 It has at least four different interpretations. Accord-
ing to the first interpretation of the term, principles are considered to
be means of description and explanation in particular grammars, both in
synchronic and diachronic ones. In this sense, principles are concrete con-
straints, restrictions on the rules of a particular grammar, of a particular
linguistic theory. The first modern use of the term, attributable to the
neogrammarian Hermann Paul (1874), regards the principle of analogy
as the main explanatory principle of diachronic grammar. The leading
theoretician of Copenhagen structuralism, Louis Hjelmslev (1929; 1953)
proposes principles in the synchronic, structural description of language
and takes the principle of analysis to be the most important one. In
Chomsky’s (1995) minimalist program, the important principle of econ-
omy, which makes it possible to choose from alternative derivations of a
sentence taking into account economic considerations, is also based on
the first sense of principle.
The second interpretation of the term can be formulated as follows:
principles are very general constraints on scientific descriptions of lan-
guages, i.e., they are not principles of particular synchronic or diachronic,
descriptive or explanatory grammars but are imposed on grammars in
general. The second interpretation of principle can also be recovered in
Hjelmslev’s (1929; 1953) works in linguistics. In this sense, principles are
meta-meta principles such as criteria of simplicity, logical consistency,
economy, exhaustive description etc. These general science theoretical
and methodological constraints on the description of language are also
valid for any kind of scientific theories.17
With the study of language use gaining increasing momentum from
the 1970s on, a third, new interpretation of the term principle has ap-
peared in the pragmatic literature. In this sense, principles operate in
real language use, they are empirical, normative prescriptions followed by
the language users consciously or unconsciously in order to communicate
with each other successfully. These principles—e.g., Grice’s (1975/1989)
cooperative principle, Leech’s (1983) politeness principle — can also be
considered strategies or heuristics. This third interpretation of principle
16 The first use of the term principle can be attributed to Aristotle.
17 These general requirements come from the philosophy of science and theory of
science at the beginning of the 20th century.
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is identical with the second sense of rule, as was already mentioned in
section 3.1.
And finally, there is a fourth interpretation of principle in the prag-
matics literature, which has a growing importance in pragmatic studies.
The fourth interpretation is similar to the third one in the sense that it
treats principles as empirical, operating in real communicative situations,
but it differs from the third interpretation in that it does not consider
principles normative, prescriptive constraints. Principles in the fourth
sense are empirical generalizations on the communicative behaviour of
language users such as Sperber and Wilson’s (1986/1995) communicative
principle of relevance and a later extension of it to the whole of hu-
man cognition, i.e., the cognitive principle of relevance (Sperber–Wilson
1995).18 Sperber and Wilson do not assume an explicit knowledge and
observation of the principles of relevance. The principles of relevance
cannot be violated or flouted, the intention to behave relevantly and the
presumption of relevance are innate properties of the human mind.
The term principle is widely used in the pragmatics literature in the
above-mentioned third and fourth interpretations. So, on the one hand,
principles of communicative language use are constraints, prescriptions
and strategies that must be followed by language users in verbal commu-
nication in their negotiating behaviour, and, on the other hand, principles
are statements that can be formulated as empirical generalizations about
the language users’ behaviour. Since one of the goals of the present pa-
per is to overview and evaluate some typical principles of communicative
language use, I will henceforward use the term principle in the third and
fourth interpretations in accordance with the pragmatics tradition. Fur-
thermore, in section 5, I will evaluate which particular principles are used
in the third and which in the fourth sense of the term.
After completing the necessary preliminary tasks—i.e., defining com-
municative language use and the term principle —indicated in section 1,
I will start to discuss principles of communicative language use in the
next section.19
18 Sperber and Wilson propose only one principle of relevance, namely the commu-
nicative one in the first edition of their book in 1986. In the second, 1995 edition
they take into account the latest developments of relevance theory and extend
the presumption of relevance to the whole of human cognition, proposing two
principles of relevance, communicative and cognitive principles.
19 As a starting-point for the study of principles of communicative language use, see
Németh T. (2003).
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4. Principles of communicative language use
4.1. Two classic principles
4.1.1. Grice’s cooperative principle
Grice (1975/1989) investigates the conditions of the organization and op-
eration of everyday language use irrespective of its subject matter and
formulates the cooperative principle in order to explain the logic of con-
versations. The cooperative principle (Grice ibid., 26) expresses the com-
municative partners’ expectations as how to behave in conversations:20
(1) cooperative principle:
Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which
it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you
are engaged.
Grice distinguishes four categories under the cooperative principle and,
echoing Kant, he calls them the categories of quantity, quality, relation
and manner. Without going into the details of these well known maxims,
I want to note only that these categories govern not only information
processing in everyday conversations, but also all kinds of rational social
behaviour as it was emphasized by Grice (ibid., 28) himself.
Since the meaning of utterances in everyday conversations cannot
be identified with the meaning of sentences uttered, first of all, Grice in-
tends to uncover the meaning of the utterances (cf. also Grice 1957/1989;
1968/1989).21 In addition to the explicit (in other words: literal, conven-
tional) meaning of utterances, speakers convey implicit inferences, that
is, in Gricean terms, conversational implicatures by means of flouting
one—or more—of the above maxims relying on the cooperative princi-
ple.22 Conversational implicatures must be capable of being worked out
on the basis of (i) the conventional meaning of the utterance, (ii) the
20 The page numbers cited refer to the 1989 edition.
21 Grice (1957/1989; 1968/1989) distinguishes sentence meaning, utterer’s/speaker’s
meaning and utterance meaning. (In the present paper, I will use speaker’s mean-
ing rather than utterer’s meaning.) Speaker’s meaning and utterance meaning
are closely related, the latter is derivative of the former. Because of the close
relationship between the two terms, speaker’s meaning and utterance meaning
are normally used as synonyms in the pragmatics literature.
22 Grice (1975/1989, 30) enumerates four cases of failing to fulfil a maxim in a talk
exchange. Only the fourth case, i.e., flouting a maxim, gives rise to a conversa-
tional implicature. In this case a maxim is being exploited.
Acta Linguistica Hungarica 51, 2004
the principles of communicative language use 391
cooperative principle and its maxims, (iii) the context of the utterance,
(iv) background knowledge and (v) by means of the assumption that
information on the first four points are mutually available to partici-
pants.23 According to Grice, the most general and important purpose
of conversations is effective information exchange between participants.
The cooperative principle and the four maxims provide rational tools for
it. If an utterance is intended to be processed only in its literal mean-
ing, then rationality, or more exactly, the fulfilling of the cooperative
principle and its maxims is self-evident. But one can ask whether it is
rational to convey information to be inferred, i.e., conversational impli-
catures in addition to the literal meaning of an utterance. In the course
of working out a conversational implicature, the hearer starts out from
the presumption that the speaker behaves cooperatively and observes the
cooperative principle. If a conversational maxim seems not to be fulfilled,
then this does not automatically count as the violation of a maxim. In-
stead, not fulfilling a maxim attracts the hearer’s attention to infer a
further meaning intended by the speaker, i.e., not fulfilling a maxim re-
ally is its exploitation in order to convey a conversational implicature. To
transfer a covered, additional meaning by means of the literal meaning
of an utterance explicitly expressed in a context, as well as relying on
conversational presumptions, is a very economic—but unfortunately not
very safe24 —way of information transmission. Consequently, a conversa-
tional exchange fulfilling the cooperative principle and, at the same time,
exploiting a maxim can also be considered a kind of rational behaviour.
Establishing the cooperative principle and the maxims under it, as
well as demonstrating how they operate in conversations, Grice (1975/
1989) has started a research programme in pragmatics which has the
primary aim of finding and describing the rational tools and manners of
effective information transfer in human cooperative verbal and nonver-
bal behaviour.25 However, one cannot forget about the fact that Grice
23 Implicatures which can be intuitively grasped but cannot be worked out in the
above-mentioned way do not count as conversational implicatures, they are con-
ventional implicatures (Grice 1975/1989, 31).
24 This kind of information transmission can be unsafe, or, in other words, not
successful. It can happen that the communicative partner does not infer any con-
versational implicatures, or he/she infers conversational implicatures not intended
by the speaker.
25 At this point of the paper I do not differentiate between communication and
information conveying. If we study Grice’s theory from the point of view of
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(ibid., 28) supposes all sorts of other maxims such as e.g., be polite. Aes-
thetic, social or moral maxims are also fulfilled in the conversations and
they may also induce implicit inferences, i.e., they may generate conver-
sational implicatures. Grice’s maxims are proposed to guide maximally
effective exchange of information,26 therefore he (ibid., 28) admits that
his maxims need to be generalized to allow for more general purposes
such as influencing others’ actions.
4.1.2. Leech’s politeness principle
The other classic principle of the pragmatics literature, namely the po-
liteness principle (Leech 1983), focuses on the social aspects of verbal
communication and prescribes for the communicative partners how to
communicate in order to maintain and care for the polite interpersonal
relation between them. Leech (ibid., 81) formulates the politeness prin-
ciple both in a negative and a positive form, prescribing what not to say
as well as what to say in order to be polite.27
(a)(2) politeness principle in the negative form:
Minimize (other things being equal) the expression of impolite beliefs.
(b) politeness principle in the positive form:
Maximize (other things being equal) the expression of polite beliefs.
Leech (ibid., 131–51) introduces seven specific maxims (tact, generosity,
approbation, modesty, agreement, sympathy and phatic maxims)28 in
order to make explicit what it exactly means to be adequately polite
in a Gricean cooperative conversation. Politeness maxims concern the
relationship between two participants in conversation whom Leech calls
self (normally identified with the speaker) and other (normally identified
explanatory adequacy, we can meet with several problems. For these problems,
see e.g., Kempson (1975) and Kiefer (1979).
26 Effective exchange of information means the exchange of information on objects
in Gricean theory.
27 The verb say is not used here as a Gricean term but in its everyday meaning.
28 The phatic maxim is not included in the enumeration of politeness maxims at
the beginning of the chapter cited here (cf. Leech 1983, 132), but it is not sur-
prising that after the elaboration of maxims it appears in the table summarizing
principles and maxims which are important in the interpersonal rhetoric at the
end of the chapter (cf. Leech ibid., 149).
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with the hearer).29 Not going into the details of the characterization of
maxims, it is worth noting that Leech does not evaluate all of the maxims
as equally important. The importance of maxims is influenced by general
considerations and expectations that (i) politeness focuses more strongly
on other than on self, (ii) negative politeness is a more weighty constraint
than positive politeness, and, furthermore, (iii) politeness towards the
hearer is more important than politeness towards a third party. Taking
into account these general considerations and fulfilling maxims result in
a polite conversation.
In addition to the politeness and cooperative principles, Leech (1983)
proposes other principles as well. The irony principle makes it possible
to avoid open conflicts in social relations by using irony, the banter prin-
ciple marks a playful relatedness between participants, the interest prin-
ciple prescribes to be unpredictable, and, finally, the Pollyanna principle
postulates that participants in a conversation prefer pleasant topics to
unpleasant ones.
There are interesting theoretical questions with regard to what rela-
tions the above-mentioned principles and maxims have to each other and
whether they have identical and equal theoretical status in the description
of the operation of polite conversations. The seven maxims established
by Leech are ordered under the politeness principle in the same way as
the four Gricean maxims are supervised by the cooperative principle.
The politeness and cooperative principles are situated at the same level
in the course of language use together with the interest principle and the
Pollyanna principle. These first-order principles govern polite language
use in communication directly. The irony and banter principles cannot
influence language use directly, they rely upon the implicatures of the
first-order principles, consequently they can be considered higher-order
principles. The higher-order principles involve more indirectness in the
working out of the utterance meaning. In spite of the difference between
the first-order and the higher-order principles from the empirical point of
view, all these principles have the same theoretical status in the descrip-
tion: they are not subordinated to each other (cf. Leech 1983, 149).
The principles and maxims mentioned above direct interpersonal
rhetoric.30 Interpersonal rhetoric focuses on goal-oriented speech situa-
29 Of course, speakers also show politeness to third parties who are not necessarily
present in the speech situation (Leech 1983, 131).
30 The other component of classic rhetoric, i.e., textual rhetoric, has no importance
for the present argumentation.
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tions, in which the participants use language in order to reach particular
effects in the partners’ mind. Notice that this interpretation of interper-
sonal rhetoric is not far from the Gricean notion of rationality. I will
return to this observation in subsection 4.1.3 and section 5.
In summary: Leech has started another important research pro-
gramme in pragmatics by studying the role of politeness in interpersonal
rhetoric. This research programme has the primary purpose to describe
the norms of politeness in everyday communication in addition to the
rationality considerations emphasized by Grice.
4.1.3. Problems with Grice’s and Leech’s theories
There are at least two serious problems from the point of view of the
present paper with Grice’s (1975/1989) and Leech’s (1983) theories which
have to be mentioned: 1. neither the cooperative principle and its max-
ims nor the politeness principle and its maxims are defined exactly, and
2. neither Grice nor Leech give an explicit, complete model of commu-
nication (cf. Kiefer 1979; Németh T. 1996, 11–2; Sperber–Wilson 1986/
1995, 28–38).31 The Gricean model concentrates on the hearer’s side,
how a hearer infers the intended speaker’s meaning by recovering con-
versational implicatures, and it does not deal with the question of how
the linguistic meaning of a sentence can serve as a basis for conversa-
tional implicatures to be inferred. The politeness model emphasizes the
interpersonal character of the communicative interaction, it investigates
the tools of maintaining a polite communicative relation. The tools of
politeness and manners of behaving politely in communication provide
information on the persons participating in conversations and on the re-
lationships between them. Although both Grice and Leech appreciate
the other’s principles, Grice is interested in characterizing effective in-
formation transmission on objects in communicative interactions, while
Leech is interested in the interpersonal characteristics of conversations.
Consequently, their models do not sufficiently describe communication.
The problems that emerge in connection with the cooperative and
politeness principles were partly solved in the pragmatics literature by
modifying them, and partly by introducing new principles.
31 As one of the reviewers of the present paper has noted, these two points are
not problems with just Grice’s and Leech’s theories, they are commonly shared
problems in pragmatics: there are no exact definitions of pragmatic terms and
no complete theory of communication. One of the tasks of future pragmatics
research is to solve these problems in order to become a more exact, formalizable
discipline.
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4.2. Further principles
4.2.1. Principles related to the Gricean theory
One of the developments of the Gricean theory can be found in Kasher’s
(1976) approach to everyday conversations. Kasher generalizes the Gri-
cean categories from a philosophical point of view. He reduces the coop-
erative principle and its maxims to a unique rationality principle. This
general rationality principle can be extended to explain not only coop-
erative communication but also all kinds of human intentional activity.
However, it is worth noting that the reduction of the cooperative principle
to a very general rationality principle is in full accordance with Grice’s
original idea. Grice (1975/1989, 29) himself assumes that the coopera-
tive principle can be generalized to all forms of human social behaviour.
Kasher’s (ibid., 205) rationality principle is formulated as (3).
(3) rationality principle:
Given a desired end, one is to choose that action which most effectively, and at
least cost, attains that end, other things being equal.
The major presumption behind the rationality principle is that human be-
ings are rational agents whose intentional actions aim to reach particular
goals well-defined within a certain context. Goals, beliefs and attitudes
in a given context are assumed to offer sufficient grounds for a satisfac-
tory justification of the agents’ rational behaviour. The presumption of
rationality plays a very important role in the understanding of everyday
human intentional activity, as well as in its theoretical description and
explanation.32
Another modification of the Gricean theory can be found in Horn’s
(1984/1998) theory of pragmatic inferences. Horn envisages a partial re-
ductionist program by formulating his well-known Q(uantity)- and R(e-
lation)-principles. Horn intends to define communication by means of
necessary and sufficient conditions, taking into account the dynamism of
communication, i.e., both the speaker’s side and the hearer’s side of the
communication. He boils down the four Gricean maxims to the above
two fundamental principles. Horn starts out from Zipf’s (1949) and Mar-
tinet’s (1962) functional economy considerations, from the principle of
32 The description of the operation of Kasher’s (1976) extended rationality principle
is very similar to the characterization of the relevance principles given by Sper-
ber and Wilson (1986/1995). I will return to the similarities of the rationality
principles and the relevance principles later.
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least effort originally applied in historical linguistics to explain language
change.33 The speaker-based and the hearer-based formulations of the
principle of least effort can conflict, i.e., be antinomic. For example, the
interpretation of a linguistic expression the production of which needs
less effort from the speaker may require more effort from the hearer. Or
the opposite of this can also happen, and the use of a linguistic expression
the interpretation of which costs less effort from the hearer’s point of view
may require more effort from the speaker’s side. Horn (1984/1998, 384–
8)34 argues that these two antinomic forces and the interaction between
them are responsible for generating Gricean conversational maxims, as
well as for generating the schema and manners for pragmatic inferences,
i.e., conversational implicatures. Applying a partly reductionist approach
and taking into account the speaker-based and the hearer-based economy
principles, Horn (ibid., 385) proposes the following two principles instead
of the Gricean four maxims:35
(a)(4) q-principle (hearer-based):
Make your contribution sufficient (cf. Quantity1). Say as much as you can
(given R).
(b) r-principle (speaker-based):
Make your contribution necessary (cf. Relation, Quantity2, Manner).
Horn (1984/1998, 396–414) illustrates that the Q-principle and the R-
principle only apparently conflict with each other by explaining several
various synchronic and diachronic, grammatical and pragmatic phenom-
ena. In Horn’s opinion, there is a division of pragmatic labour between
his two principles. This division of pragmatic labour helps to maintain
an economic balance between the speaker and the hearer in the course
of communication.
Levinson (1987/1998) also criticizes the Gricean theory, analysing
the Q(uantity)- and I(nformativeness)-implicatures both resulting from
the Gricean quantity maxim. Studying the role played by Q- and I-
implicatures in establishing the scope of negation and in the interpre-
tation of scalar expressions, Levinson convincingly argues for the claim
33 The principle of least effort concerns not only linguistic phenomena but also all
kinds of human behaviour.
34 The page numbers cited here refer to the 1998 edition.
35 Horn indicates in brackets what Gricean maxims are reduced in the given princi-
ple.
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that there is an anomaly between the two types of implicatures.36 The
anomaly between the Q- and I-implicatures can be solved by developing
a more exact definition of informativeness in communication. Levinson
(ibid., 562) proposes the minimization principle, which can be considered
a little controversial or even paradoxical at first glance. This principle
regulates the economy of information processing in communication. The
minimization principle is formed as in (5):
(5) minimization principle:
Minimized forms get maximized interpretation. The less you say, the more you
mean.
The minimization principle concerns the connection between the explicit
linguistic expression and the pragmatic inferences derivable from its use
in a given context. Levinson demonstrates and illustrates how the mini-
mization principle works in three distinct research areas: in the Gricean
inferential model, in conversation analysis and in syntax. The appli-
cability of the minimization principle in syntax proves that principles
originally used in the explanation of pragmatic phenomena can be used
with considerable explanatory power in grammar as well.
In his latest grandscale, inspiring book, Levinson (2000) gives a syn-
thesis of the results of neo-Gricean pragmatics and develops a theory of
generalized conversational implicatures. The concept of generalized con-
versational implicature is one of the Gricean notions, but only minimal
attention was devoted to it in pragmatics. Levinson (ibid., 21–7) assumes
three levels of meaning: 1. sentence meaning, 2. utterance-token mean-
ing and 3. a level of meaning between the first two, i.e., utterance-type
meaning. Sentence meaning must be explicated by a grammar, utterance-
token meaning, or, in Gricean terms, speaker’s meaning can be recovered
by means of inferring particular conversational implicatures in accordance
with the speaker’s intentions in a given context. Gricean pragmatics with
its cooperative principle and maxims explains how particular conversa-
tional implicatures can be inferred in a given context. At the level of
meaning between sentence meaning and utterance-token meaning, i.e., in
utterance-type meaning, systematic pragmatic inferences independent of
particular contexts can be captured. These systematic pragmatic infer-
ences are based on our general presumptions about how normal, usual,
36 Q- and I-implicatures are widely studied in the post-Gricean literature. For the
relevant works, see Levinson (1987/1998).
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everyday communication works. Speech acts, Gricean conventional impli-
catures, felicity conditions, preference organizations of conversations, as
well as generalized conversational implicatures discussed by Levinson in
detail can be analysed at the level of utterance-type meaning. Levinson
(ibid., 73–164) considers generalized conversational implicatures to be de-
fault, stereotypical inferences generated by the operation of the following
three principles:37
(a)(6) q(uantity)-principle:
Do not provide a statement that is informationally weaker than your knowl-
edge of the world allows, unless providing an informationally stronger state-
ment would contravene the I-principle.
(b) i(nformativeness)-principle:
Say as little as necessary, i.e., produce the minimal linguistic information
sufficient to achieve your communicational ends (bearing Q in mind).
(c) m(anner)-principle:
Indicate an abnormal, nonstereotypical situation by using marked expres-
sions that contrast with those you would use to describe the corresponding
normal, stereotypical situation.
In order to illustrate what kind of generalized conversational implicatures
can be induced by the principles in (6), consider the examples in (7):
(a)(7) Some of the girls came. (Scalar) generalized conversational implicature in-
duced by the Q-principle: ‘Not all of the girls came.’
(b) Peter and Mary bought a house. Generalized conversational implicature in-
duced by the I-principle: ‘Peter and Mary bought the house together.’
(c) Charles had enough money to travel to London. Generalized conversational
implicature induced by the M-principle: ‘Charles didn’t travel to London.’
Levinson (2000) also demonstrates that generalized conversational impli-
catures can be cancelled by once inferences, i.e., particular conversational
implicatures, as well as by information explicitly expressed in the utter-
ance. The deletion processes are governed by the same principles that
induce generalized conversational implicatures. Consequently, Q-, I- and
M-principles express, on the one hand, relations between generalized con-
versational implicatures (utterance-type meanings) and particular con-
37 Levinson formulates his Q-, I- and M-principles in greater detail. He takes into
account both the speaker’s and hearer’s interests. The speaker-based formulation
of the principles in (6) is also part of Levinson’s definition, and it is enough to
cite only them for the purposes of the present paper.
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versational implicatures (utterance-token meanings), and, on the other
hand, relations between generalized conversational implicatures and the
explicit linguistic meaning (sentence meaning) as well.
It is Gricean pragmatics that also serves as a starting-point for an-
other current pragmatic theory, namely for relevance theory as developed
by Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995). However, relevance theory differs
from the above-mentioned neo-Gricean pragmatic theories, which can be
easily related to each other. Sperber and Wilson do not only modify or re-
duce the Gricean cooperative principle and the maxims under it, but they
also introduce a new principle which is a non-prescriptive generalization
about communication instead of the normative principles.38 Sperber and
Wilson’s (ibid., 158) communicative principle of relevance is given in (8):
(8) communicative principle of relevance:
Every act of ostensive communication communicates a presumption of its own
optimal relevance.
Before generally characterizing the way the communicative principle of
relevance operates, the terms used in the definition must be explained.
First, let us see the term ostensive communication. Sperber and Wilson
(1986/1995, 63) define it as follows:
(9) ostensive-inferential communication:
The communicator produces a stimulus which makes it mutually manifest to com-
municator and audience that the communicator intends, by means of this stimu-
lus, to make manifest or more manifest to the audience a set of assumptions {I}.
Two kinds of intentions are hidden in the definition in (9). The first
one concerns the information {I} itself to be transferred in communica-
tion (cf. (10a)), and the second one concerns the intention to inform the
communicative partner on {I} (cf. (10b)).
(a)(10) informative intention:
to make manifest or more manifest to the audience a set of assumptions {I}
(Sperber – Wilson 1986/1995, 58).
(b) communicative intention:
to make it mutually manifest to audience and communicator that the com-
municator has this informative intention (Sperber – Wilson ibid., 61).
38 For empirical tests of relevance theory, see Happé (1993) and Noveck–Sperber
(2004).
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The information the communicator wants to convey is a set of assump-
tions {I}. By assumptions, Sperber and Wilson mean thoughts treated
by an individual as representations of the actual world. The facts of the
actual world—represented by assumptions—are manifest to an individual
at a given time if the individual is capable at that time of representing
them mentally and accepting their representations as true or probably
true (Sperber–Wilson 1986/1995, 2, 39). In ostensive-inferential commu-
nication communicators fulfil their intentions by means of some kind of
ostensive behaviour. Communicators behave in such a way that their
partners could observe their intention to transfer information. Observ-
ing communicators’ ostensive behaviour, communicative partners make
inferences with regard to the communicators’ intentions and process the
intended information.
The term presumption of optimal relevance in the formulation of the
communicative principle of relevance has not been defined yet. The opti-
mal relevance of an ostensive stimulus refers to the economy balance be-
tween the effects reached by it and the efforts needed to process it. More
exactly, an ostensive stimulus is relevant optimally, on the one hand, if
it is relevant enough for it to be worth the adressee’s effort to process
it. And on the other hand, an ostensive stimulus is relevant optimally if
it is the most relevant one compatible with the communicator’s abilities
and preferences (Sperber–Wilson 1995, 270).39 An ostensive stimulus is
always presumed to be relevant, otherwise participants of the commu-
nicative interaction do not bother to process it.
Sperber and Wilson apply the communicative principle of relevance
not only to explain ways of inferring information implicitly transmitted in
the communication but also to recover the complete communicated mean-
ing, as well as to define the linguistic meaning as part of the complete
communicated information. With this approach Sperber and Wilson,
first, eliminate the one-sidedness of previous models of communication,
which either focused only on the linguistic meaning as code-models (e.g.,
the Jakobsonian model) did, or concentrated on the implicit information
inferred by communicative partners as the Gricean model did. And sec-
ond, they demonstrate that inferential processes are also indispensable
39 It can be seen that the term relevance used by Sperber and Wilson differs from
the Gricean maxim of relation to a great extent.
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for constructing the linguistic (in a relevance theoretical term, explicit)
meaning.40
Sperber and Wilson have considered communication an important
sub-case of human cognition since the very first formulation of relevance
theory. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that the authors apply a re-
duction to the communicative principle of relevance and refer the pre-
sumption of relevance to all human cognition. Accordingly, in the second
summary of the theory they formulate the cognitive principle of rele-
vance, as in (11).
(11) cognitive principle of relevance:
Human cognition tends to be geared to the maximization of relevance (Sperber –
Wilson 1995, 260).
The cognitive principle of relevance states that the human mind tends
to be organized not only to seek for relevance or to prove it, but human
cognitive mechanisms are geared to maximize relevance. Maximizing rel-
evance means that cognitive mechanisms try to process the most relevant
information in the most relevant manner, i.e., they intend to achieve the
greatest cognitive effect with the least processing effort.41
To summarize, both relevance principles are a kind of economy prin-
ciple. The relevance principle cited in (8) refers to a particular form of
human cognition, i.e., to communication. The other relevance principle
cited in (11) is a very general principle which characterizes all human
cognition. In contrast with the principles discussed above, neither the
communicative principle of relevance, nor the cognitive principle of rele-
vance are prescriptive in nature. Neither one is a norm to be observed,
instead, they are generalizations about communication and cognition.
Because of restrictions on the scope of this paper, I will not investi-
gate other principles which can also be connected to Gricean pragmatics.
Therefore, I will now turn to the approaches related to the other classic
principle, i.e., the politeness principle.
40 The relation between the inferential processes and the explicit meaning of utter-
ances are analysed and illustrated in Bibok (2003).
41 For a discussion of the biological and cognitive motivation of the cognitive prin-
ciple of relevance, see Sperber – Wilson (1995, 261–3).
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4.2.2. Principles related to the politeness principle
Studying the role played by politeness in communicative language use,
and, furthermore, in all kinds of social human behaviour, is one of the
important and preferred research areas not only in linguistic pragmatics
but also in social psychology.
Goffman (1955; 1959), one of the leading theoreticians in early social
psychology, relates politeness to the concept of face. Goffman (1955, 5)
defines face as the positive value a person effectively claims for himself/
herself by the line others assume he/she has taken during a particular
interaction. Face is an image of the self. Since face includes positive
social attributes and values, politeness can be understood as the mutual
intention to maintain these positive social values, i.e., to save each other’s
face in communication. Although Goffman has not formulated face sav-
ing briefly and explicitly similarly to principles analysed in the previous
sections, the main content of face saving can be summarized as follows:
(12) principle of face saving:
Save your own and your partner’s face in communication.
It is a universally accepted aspiration that participants in communication
save not only their own faces but also their partners’. Communicators try
to avoid performing speech acts endangering faces of their partners, such
as e.g., requests, or even threatening partners’ faces, such as commands.42
If communicators still have to perform face endangering or threatening
speech acts, they necessarily try to reduce the extent of endangering or
threatening by using various politeness formulas, indirect speech acts, as
well as by enlarging options of how partners can react.
Similarly to the maxims of Gricean pragmatics, Lakoff (1973; 1979)
defines the norms of politeness before the formulation of Leech’s (1983)
politeness theory.43 Lakoff proposes a main principle to guide polite
verbal behaviour in the same way as Grice proposes a main principle—the
42 If the communicator asks his/her partner to do something, he/she assumes that
the partner would not perform the requested action in the normal circumstances,
in the normal flow of events. The communicator assumes that an intention to
perform the requested action is not included in the partner’s face. That is why re-
quests (and their strongest forms, commands) can be considered face endangering
or threatening speech acts.
43 Lakoff’s politeness theory has not become known so widely as Leech’s theory has,
therefore I have labelled Leech’s politeness principle as a classic principle and
discussed it earlier, before Lakoff’s norms.
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cooperative principle—to govern rational cooperative behaviour. Lakoff
considers politeness a device used in order to reduce frictions and conflicts
in personal interactions. She characterizes her politeness principle by
means of three maxims ordered under it (Lakoff 1973), given in (13).
(13) politeness principle: Be polite.
Maxims: 1. Do not impose (used when formal/impersonal politeness is required).
2. Give options (used when informal politeness is required).
3. Make a partner feel good (used when intimate politeness is required).
The maxims in (13) are applicable more or less depending on the context
and politeness situation as understood by the communicator. The first
maxim assumes a more formal relation between the participants than the
second and the third maxims. There is a more personal relation between
the participants under the second, and, further, the third maxim. While
the Gricean cooperative principle and the four maxims under it have to
be observed all together at the same time, Lakoff’s maxims originally
refer to different situations.
Schlenker (1980) further develops Goffman’s line of research in social
psychology, investigating what principles govern human social behaviour.
One of the central categories of his theory is impression management.
Schlenker (ibid., 6) defines impression management as the conscious or
unconscious attempt of participants to control images projected in real
or imagined social interactions. According to this notion of impression
management, Schlenker (ibid., 105–10) supposes an association principle
to regulate human social behaviour in interactions:
(14) association principle:
People claim desirable images and avoid claiming undesirable ones.
In other words: people want to establish their personal association with
desirable images and disestablish their personal association with undesir-
able ones. The association principle is followed by communicative part-
ners in the way that they try to maximize the attractiveness of their
acquired properties, relations etc., and, at the same time, they try to
minimize antipathy towards them (Nemesi 2000, 420). The association
principle regulates, on the one hand, self-expression and self-projection,
and, on the other hand, solidarity with the partners in social interactions.
Another theory of interpersonal relations, namely Brown and Levin-
son’s (1978; 1987) politeness theory also relies on social psychology, es-
pecially on Goffman’s approach, but it is much more of a linguistic prag-
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matic theory than merely a social psychological one. Brown and Levinson
aim to reveal, first, what strategies are applied by communicative part-
ners in their conversations, and, second, what linguistic forms can be
used to perform politeness strategies.44 Politeness strategies originate in
Goffman’s face, but Brown and Levinson divide it into two parts. The
first component of the face, i.e., the negative face, refers to people’s de-
sire that other people do not prevent them in their actions, whereas the
other component, i.e., positive face, includes people’s desire that their
wishes, aims, attitudes etc. would be desirable for others as well. Polite-
ness strategies help to construct and save negative and positive face in
social interactions. Similarly to the formulation of Goffman’s principle of
face saving given in (12), the underlying principle of politeness strategies
proposed by Brown and Levinson (1978; 1987) can be summarized and
generalized as follows:45
(15) underlying principle of politeness strategies:
Save your own and your partner’s negative and positive face in communication.
Similarly to the above-mentioned theories based on social psychologi-
cal considerations, Nemesi (1997/1998; 2000) also intends to unify ap-
proaches to self expression and linguistic pragmatic principles in the
course of analysing linguistic aspects of impression management. He
assumes a more specific version of the association principle (cf. (14))
concentrating on verbal communication, the relevant form of social inter-
actions from the linguistic point of view (Nemesi 2000, 426).
(16) principle of linguistic impression management:
In verbal interactions people try to present themselves linguistically in such a way
that they would like to be seen in.
The principle of linguistic impression management makes a generaliza-
tion that people consciously or unconsciously try to influence their part-
ners’ opinion about them in accordance with their desires in conversa-
tions. Participants in conversations want to achieve this aim by means
of choosing particular linguistic forms or by using particular linguis-
44 It must be admitted that Brown and Levinson (1978; 1987) do not differentiate
politeness strategies and the linguistic forms by which politeness strategies are
performed consequently.
45 For an application to Hungarian data of Brown and Levinson’s politeness theory,
see e.g., Síklaki (1994, 151–72).
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tic forms according to their desires. Although impression management
is a universal phenomenon, strategies performing linguistic impression
management can be considered language- and culture-specific, and even
context-dependent in the same way as politeness strategies in Brown and
Levinson’s (1978; 1987) theory. Nemesi (2000, 426–33) establishes various
sub-strategies of linguistic impression management and illustrates them
by data from Hungarian communicative language use. He mentions, for
example, identifying oneself emotionally with the partner, maintaining
partner’s interest, focusing on highly accepted social values, and avoid-
ing or at least reducing undesirable consequences of faults and mistakes.
The literature on politeness and related phenomena could be treated
further. Kasper’s (1996) paper provides an excellent summary of the
latest developments in the study of the field. However, it can be seen
from the brief synopsis of the theories given in the present article that two
distinct approaches can be differentiated with respect to how politeness
operates in social interactions. The first approach prescribes how to
behave politely in communication by means of maxims, and the second
one generalizes strategies of how people behave in order to be polite in
communication.
After the above brief and very general overview of principles of com-
municative language use, the next section is intended, first, to evaluate
the principles independently of any particular pragmatic theory, and, sec-
ond, to re-evaluate them relying on the definition of ostensive-inferential
communication.
5. An evaluation and re-evaluation of the principles of
communicative language use
5.1. A theory-independent evaluation of principles
The principles mentioned in section 4 can be divided into two main groups
in a natural manner inspired by their character and important empirical
generalizations that can be made about them. The first group includes ra-
tionality principles, and the second group contains interpersonality prin-
ciples. Let us evaluate rationality principles first.
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5.1.1. Rationality principles
The rationality principles in the first group concern the economy of
communicative interactions. Some of them, namely the Gricean (1975/
1989) cooperative principle, Kasher’s (1976) rationality principle, Horn’s
(1984/1998) Q- and R-principles, Levinson’s (1987/1998) minimization
principle are pragmatic principles governing information transmission in
communication. They play a crucial role mostly in recovering information
implicitly conveyed by communicators, i.e., conversational implicatures.
Kasher’s (1976) rationality principle can be considered more general than
the other principles because it is intended to explain all kinds of rational
and intentional human activity.46 However, Kasher (ibid.) demonstrates
how the rationality principle works by analysing information transmis-
sion in communication.
The rationality principles also intrude into the domain of grammar,
consequently, they start becoming both pragmatic and grammatical prin-
ciples. The intrusion of rationality principles into grammar can be illus-
trated, for example, by applying Horn’s (1984/1998) Q- and R-principles
in the syntax and the historical linguistic explanation of language change;
Sperber and Wilson’s (1986/1995) communicative principle of relevance
in the construction of utterance meaning, and Levinson’s (2000) Q-, I-
and M-principles in the syntax, at the semantics-pragmatics interface
and in historical linguistics. It has to be emphasized that the Q-, I-
and M-principles are indispensable for explaining generalized conversa-
tional implicatures at the semantics-pragmatics interface at the new level
of meaning between sentence meaning and utterance-token meaning as
suggested by Levinson (2000).
With regard to the rationality principles concerning the economy
of communication, it is worth noting once again that Kasher’s (1976)
rationality principle, as well as Sperber and Wilson’s (1995) cognitive
principle of relevance are valid not only for verbal communication but
also for all forms of language use. And furthermore, Kasher’s princi-
ple refers to all kinds of intentional human activity—as was mentioned
above —, while the cognitive principle of relevance refers to all human
cognition.
46 The economy principle of least effort proposed by Zipf (1949) which serves as a
basis for Horn’s and Levinson’s principles also has a wider scope, referring to the
whole of the human universe.
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The Gricean (1975/1989) cooperative principle, Kasher’s (1976) ra-
tionality principle, Horn’s (1984/1998) Q- and R-principles, Levinson’s
(1987/1998) minimization principle and Levinson’s (2000) Q-, I- and M-
principles form norms to be observed in communication according to the
third interpretation of the term principle, so they have a prescriptive
power. The remaining rationality principles treated here, i.e., Sperber
and Wilson’s (1995) communicative and cognitive principles of relevance
do not have a normative character, they are descriptive generalizations
according to the fourth interpretation of the term principle demonstrated
in section 3.2.
5.1.2. Interpersonality principles
The other group contains principles which concern interpersonal relations
in communication and various forms of polite social behaviour, as well as
the self-projection of the communicative partners. Some interpersonality
principles, such as Lakoff’s (1973; 1979) politeness principle and Leech’s
(1983) politeness principle, can be closely connected to Gricean maxim-
based pragmatics, they are prescriptions for how to behave politely. The
other interpersonality principles have completely—like Goffman’s (1955;
1959) principle of face saving and Schlenker’s (1980) association princi-
ple—or partly—like Brown and Levinson’s (1978; 1987) politeness strate-
gies and Nemesi’s (1997/1998; 2000) principle of linguistic impression
management — a social psychological origin. The politeness principles
and maxims related to Gricean pragmatics, i.e., Lakoff’s and Leech’s
principles, as well as Goffman’s principle of face saving and Schlenker’s
association principle from the social psychological approaches, operate
as normative, prescriptive constraints, so they belong to the third in-
terpretation of the term principle. Unlike these principles, Brown and
Levinson’s (1978; 1987) politeness strategies and Nemesi’s (1997/1998;
2000) strategies of linguistic impression management can be evaluated as
empirical generalizations about how people behave in verbal social inter-
actions, consequently one can see the fourth interpretation possibility of
principle in these latter works.
Criticizing the two classic principles, I have already emphasized in
section 4.1.3 that one cannot find an explicit definition of communica-
tion underlying them. In the rest of the present paper, I will take an
explicit definition, namely Sperber and Wilson’s (1986/1995) definition
of ostensive-inferential communication, apply it to verbal communica-
tion, and, relying on it, re-evaluate principles of communicative language
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use. Finally, in the course of re-evaluating the principles surveyed, I
will demonstrate how they can be reduced to a very general rationality
principle, i.e., the cognitive principle of relevance.
5.2. Application of the definition of ostensive-inferential communication
I have already cited the definition of ostensive-inferential communication
in section 4.2.1 in (9), but in order to make my argumentation easier to
follow I repeat it here as (17):
(17) ostensive-inferential communication:
The communicator produces a stimulus which makes it mutually manifest to com-
municator and audience that the communicator intends, by means of this stimu-
lus, to make manifest or more manifest to the audience a set of assumptions {I}.
Verbal communication is the most important form of ostensive-inferential
communication for a linguist. In verbal communication the communica-
tor, i.e., the speaker/writer produces a linguistic stimulus consisting of
either acoustic or graphic signs (verbal ostension) in order to attract
the partner’s, i.e., hearer’s/reader’s, attention and to provide him/her
with some kind of information. The communicator fulfils both ostension
and encoding. The communicative partner must process the linguistic
stimulus and recover the implicit information and the communicator’s
informative intention. The partner must apply both decoding and infer-
ential procedures to fulfil these tasks. Applying this approach to verbal
communication, one can easily conclude why the previous models of ver-
bal communication were not adequate to explain it: code-models (e.g.,
the Jakobsonian model) and inferential models (e.g., the Gricean model)
treated only one or the other side or procedure of verbal communication
(cf. Németh T. 1990; 1996).
The majority of principles assumed by the pragmatics and social
psychology literature refer to communicative language use, i.e., to verbal
communication. Let us re-evaluate these principles relying on the charac-
terization of verbal communication provided in the previous paragraph.
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5.3. A re-evaluation of the rationality and interpersonality principles
on the basis of verbal ostensive-inferential communication
Notice that with the help of the definition of ostensive-inferential com-
munication information transmission and communication can and must
be distinguished. As we have seen in (10a–b) in section 4.2.1, there are
two intentions hidden in the definition of ostensive-inferential communi-
cation. One is informative intention according to which a person wants
to inform another person about something. One can have informative
intention without having an intention to make it manifest to the other
person. The other intention, included in the definition, is communicative
intention, i.e., the communicator’s intention to make his/her informative
intention mutually manifest to the partner and himself/herself. Commu-
nicative intention presupposes having informative intention. One can-
not have communicative intention without having informative intention.
Consequently, communication always includes information transmission,
but not all kinds of information transmission can be considered commu-
nication. Information transmission can operate without communicative
intention.47
Starting out from the definition of ostensive-inferential communica-
tion, it can be stated that most of the rationality principles — Grice’s
(1975/1989) cooperative principle, Kasher’s (1976) rationality principle,
Horn’s (1984/1998) Q- and R-principles, Levinson’s (1987/1998) mini-
mization principle, Levinson’s (2000) Q-, I- and M-principles—and all in-
terpersonality principles—Leech’s (1983) politeness principle, Goffman’s
(1955; 1959) principle of face saving, Lakoff’s (1973; 1979) politeness
principle, Schlenker’s (1980) association principle, Brown and Levinson’s
(1978; 1987) politeness strategies, Nemesi’s (1997/1998; 2000) principle
of linguistic impression management—refer to the content of the informa-
tive intention, i.e., to the set of assumptions {I}. The only exceptions to
47 For a detailed analysis of distinguishing between communication and information
transmission, see Németh T. (1996, 14); Ivaskó – Németh T. (2002). It would be
important to investigate the relationship between information transmission and
the other forms of language use. There are several important questions in this
respect: 1. Are there any forms of language use without information transmis-
sion? 2. Is there any kind of hierarchy between various forms of language use?
3. What forms of language use can be derived from what forms of language use,
for instance, can communicative language use be derived from verbal informa-
tion transmission? However, to answer these questions further research would be
necessary.
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this generalization are the communicative (Sperber–Wilson 1986/1995)
and cognitive (Sperber–Wilson 1995) principles of relevance.
The above-mentioned rationality principles, except the communica-
tive and cognitive principles of relevance, guide information transmission
(meaning construction) and processing (interpretation) with reference to
the object. This kind of information, expressed explicitly or implicitly,
is basically propositional in nature. Interpersonality principles concern
the information transmission and processing on selves including the com-
municative partners’ desires, wishes, intentions, aims, etc. This kind of
information does not necessarily have a propositional form, sometimes
it can hardly be propositionalized. To summarize: both rationality and
interpersonality principles refer to information transmission and process-
ing. It has to be emphasized, again, that it is not necessary to have
a communicative intention in order that these principles could operate,
they can work both in information transmission without any communica-
tive intention and in communication.
In the definition of ostensive-inferential communication, communica-
tive intention must still be dealt with further. The characterization of
communicative intention given by Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995, 61)
(cf. (10b) in section 4.2.1) makes it possible to refer to the content of
communicative intention by means of a principle operating in commu-
nication. Since in communication the communicator always has com-
municative intention according to the definition of ostensive-inferential
communication, the principle referring to the communicative intention
must be formulated in accordance with the fourth interpretation of the
term principle. Let us call this principle the principle of communicative
intention and formulate it as follows:
(18) principle of communicative intention:
In communication, communicators intend to make their informative intentions
mutually manifest.
As I have noted in section 1, Bach and Harnish (1979, 7) propose a
communicative presumption not labelled “principle” which is similar to
the principle of communicative intention in some respect.
(19) communicative presumption:
The mutual belief in CL that whenever a member says something in L to another
member H, he is doing so with some recognizable illocutionary content.48
48
CL: linguistic community; L: language; H: hearer.
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However, there is a great difference between Bach and Harnish’s com-
municative presumption and the principle of communicative intention.
Communicative presumption refers only to one kind of information, to
illocutionary intention belonging to the content of the informative inten-
tion. The principle of communicative intention has a wider scope than
communicative presumption, it refers to all kinds of information, to all
possible content of the informative intention.
At the re-evaluation of interpersonality principles, we have consid-
ered people’s intentions, desires, aims, attitudes, etc. which these princi-
ples concern as one kind of information. Therefore, conveying informa-
tive intention belongs to self-expression, and, consequently, the principle
of communicative intention is an interpersonality principle. From this
point of view, the principle of communicative intention is a higher-order
principle, it must be ordered above rationality principles concerning in-
formation transfer on objects and interpersonality principles concerning
information transmission on selves in the content of informative intention.
The principle of communicative intention serves to make the intention
to transfer both kinds of information—i.e., about objects and selves—
mutually manifest. From another point of view, the principle of commu-
nicative intention can also be evaluated as a rationality principle because
it refers to the transmission of informative intention which itself is a kind
of information. Realize that the information conveyed by the principle
of communicative intention forms a higher-level, additional range to the
content of informative intention, and having his/her communicative in-
tention the communicator makes all this information mutually manifest
in ostensive-inferential communication.
A cognitive approach always studies information transmission form
the point of view of effectiveness. Effectiveness in information transmis-
sion refers to whether the spent energy results in enough benefit. Sperber
and Wilson (1986/1995) apply this approach to ostensive-inferential com-
munication and formulate the communicative principle of relevance. The
communicative principle of relevance states that every act of ostensive-
inferential communication operates according to the effectiveness require-
ment (cf. (8) in section 4.2.1). It requires establishing a balance between
the processing efforts and contextual effects achieved. Since (i) the com-
municative principle of relevance guarantees the effectiveness of infor-
mation transmission in communication and (ii) most of the rationality
principles (exceptions are the communicative and cognitive principles of
relevance) and all interpersonality principles referring to informative in-
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tention are tools of effective information exchange on objects and selves,
one can conclude that the communicative principle of relevance makes
a generalization about the result of the operation of these principles,
i.e., communication. Rationality and interpersonality principles can be
considered particular, partial manifestations of the communicative prin-
ciple of relevance—which itself is a rationality principle—, they can be
reduced to it.
Continuing this line of thinking, we can say that since communi-
cation usually is considered one of the most important particular forms
of human cognition, generalizations about cognition — e.g., the cogni-
tive principle of relevance—must be valid for it as well. The cognitive
principle of relevance is a very general rationality principle. It is a gener-
alization about how the human mind works: it tends to be geared to the
maximization of relevance. This means that human cognition operates
in the way that it could achieve the most cognitive effects (benefit) with
the least processing effort (energy cost). Since (i) communication is a
very frequent particular form of human cognition about which the com-
municative principle of relevance makes an important generalization and
(ii) the cognitive principle of relevance makes a generalization about how
human cognition operates, it can be concluded that the communicative
principle of relevance is a particular, partial manifestation of the cognitive
principle of relevance: the communicative principle of relevance can be re-
duced to the cognitive principle of relevance. Notice that two reductions
have been made: 1. most of the rationality principles (Grice’s coopera-
tive principle, Kasher’s rationality principle, Horn’s Q- and R-principles,
Levinson’s minimization principle, Levinson’s Q-, I-, M-principles, and
the principle of communicative intention suggested in (18)) and all inter-
personality principles (Leech’s politeness principle, Goffman’s principle
of face saving, Lakoff’s politeness principle, Schlenker’s association prin-
ciple, Brown and Levinson’s politeness principles, Nemesi’s principle of
linguistic impression management, and the principle of communicative
intention suggested in (18)) working in communicative language use have
been reduced to the communicative principle of relevance, and 2. the
communicative principle of relevance has been reduced to the cognitive
principle of relevance. Thus, to summarize, we can claim that all the
principles treated above can be reduced to a very general rationality
principle, i.e., to the cognitive principle of relevance.
Finally, two remarks seem to be in order with respect to Kasher’s
(1976) rationality principle (cf. (3): Given a desired end, one is to choose
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that action which most effectively, and at least cost, attains that end,
other things being equal). Extending it to all kinds of intentional human
activity results in a principle which is more general than the communica-
tive principle of relevance, because it concerns not only communication
but also all forms of language use and other intentional activity. Con-
sequently, the communicative principle of relevance—together with all
principles reduced to it—can be reduced to the Kasher’s extended ratio-
nality principle. At the same time, this extended principle is less general
than Sperber and Wilson’s (1995) cognitive principle of relevance be-
cause the latter refers to all procedures and operations of cognition, while
Kasher’s extended rationality principle concerns only intentional actions.
So, Kasher’s extended rationality principle—together with all principles
reduced to it—can be reduced to the cognitive principle of relevance.
6. Summary
In the present paper I have studied principles of communicative language
use. After completing the preliminary tasks described in section 1.1,
first, I have characterized and evaluated some typical principles of com-
municative language use treated by the relevant literature in their own
theoretical frameworks. Then, I have demonstrated that principles can
be separated into two groups, into rationality principles and interper-
sonality principles, in a natural manner, independently of the particular
theoretical framework.
Second, I have re-evaluated the principles and I provided a new
classification for them, relying on the definition of ostensive-inferential
communication. I have demonstrated that rationality principles (which
concern information transmission on objects) and interpersonality princi-
ples (which refer to information transmission on selves) can be considered
tools of effective information transmission. On the basis of the definition
of ostensive-inferential communication, I have also formulated the prin-
ciple of communicative intention, which can be understood both as an
interpersonality principle and as a rationality principle.
Third, I have supported the plausibility of the fact that all principles
can be reduced to a very general rationality (economy) principle, i.e., the
cognitive principle of relevance.
Finally, I have also emphasized that the principles considered com-
municative ones in the pragmatics literature are really principles of effec-
tive information transmission either on objects or on selves, i.e., they play
Acta Linguistica Hungarica 51, 2004
414 enikő németh t.
a considerable role in verbal information transmission without a commu-
nicative intention. So they are valid at least in two forms of language
use: in the informative and the communicative ones. The only principles
which refer only to communicative language use are Sperber and Wil-
son’s (1986/1995) communicative principle of relevance and the principle
of communicative intention suggested in the present article.
The detailed analysis and the demonstration of whether the cognitive
principle of relevance has the same descriptive and explanatory power or
an even greater one than the reduced principles have will be the task of
further research.
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